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Summaries 
A discussion is given of a 1908 paper by the 
American E. Van Vleck. It is argued that Van Vleck 
proved the first Zero-One law, anticipating the 
Zero-One law of Bore1 and, more strikingly, that 
of Kolmogorov. A brief description of the evolution 
of the link between measure theory and probability 
theory is given. By following Van Vleck's own steps 
in deriving consequences of his Zero-One Law, a 
result ("the Extended Van Vleck Theorem") is given 
which is directly comparable to Borel's Law of 
Normal Numbers. Finally, it is shown that the 
Van Vleck Zero-One Law, which in generality falls 
between that of Bore1 and that of Kolmogorov, is 
further distinguished in that it provides the key 
step in establishing what may be the earliest 
example in Ergodic Theory of a metrically transitive 
transformation. 
Nous pr&entons une discussion d'un article 
de 1'Americain E. Van Vleck publi& en 1908. Nous 
montrons que Van Vleck d&montra la premiere loi 
"zero-un", devancant la loi zero-un de Borel, et 
surtout celle de'Kolmogorov. Nous donnons une 
brkve description de 1'Bvolution des liens entre 
la thgorie de la mesure et celle des probabi1iG.s. 
En reprenant les propres id&es de Van Vleck nous 
deduisons de sa loi zero-un r&sultat ("le thgor2me 
&endu de Van Vleck") directement comparable 2 
la Loi des Nombres Normaux de Borel. Finalement, 
nous montrons que la loi zero-un de Van Vleck, qui 
du point du vue de la g&&alit& est intermgdiare 
entre celle de Bore1 et celle de Kolmogorov, est 
aussi remarquable en ce qu'elle est une .&tape 
essentialle pour &ablir ce qui est problement 
le premier example d'un transformation mktriquement 
transitive. 
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1.a. PRELIMINARIES 
We begin with a precise description of the theorem referred 
to in the title. 
Let BO be the set of dyadic expansions (or fractions) of a 
number x in the unit interval, x = .x x 1 2...Xn... , Xi = 0 or 1, 
i = 1,2,3,... satisfying 
(1) lim Ivn(x)/Pn(x)) = 1 Ii--J 
where vn(x) = number of l’s in the first n digits of the dyadic 
expansion of x, and u,(x) = number of O’S in the first n digits 
of the dyadic expansion of x. Such numbers x are called “normal” 
in the terminology introduced by Borel. Each such dyadic expan- 
sion can be considered as the result of an infinite sequence of 
independent coin tosses (or trials) with a probability l/2 of 
“heads” (meaning digit “zero”) and probability l/2 of “tails” 
(meaning digit “one”). 
The Bore1 Law of Normal Numbers (1909) (also, and perhaps 
more commonly, called The Bore1 Strong Law of Large Numbers) 
asserts 
(2) P(Bo) = 1, 
where P(E) denotes in general the probability (suitable defined) 
of any set E of outcomes. 
Consider now a sequence of zeros and ones 
‘x1x2x3..* ' xn 
= 1 or 0 
where x, is 1 or 0 according as a sequence of biased coins turns 
up heads (probability pn) or tails (probability qn = 1 - pn). 
Then the Bore1 Zero-One Law states that the set E of those 
expansions with infinitely many ones satisfy 
(3) P(E) = 0 or 1, 
and indeed 
P(E) = 0 if C pn converges, 
P(E) = 1 if C p, diverges [l] . 
Limited to the context of digits in the binary expansion, Borel’s 
Zero-One Law asserts that the probability of infinitely many zeros 
(and/or ones) is 1. This is, of course, much weaker than the 
Strong Law, equation (2), above. 
1.b. THE STEINHAUS MAP 
The link between probability theory and measure theory has 
today been forged, and its forging played a substantial role in 
winning acceptance for probability theory among mathematicians. 
In the time of Borel, this had not yet occurred, and Borel’s 
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1909 paper represents, more than does any other single contri- 
bution, the initiation of this link. It was not until 1923 
(Steinhaus 1923) that there appeared a complete formal identifi- 
cation between probability theory applied to repeated “tosses” 
(or trials) of an identical fair coin (pn = l/2, R = 1,2,3,... 
in the notation above) and the theory of measure in the unit 
interval. Describing the situation in modern terminology, 
Steinhaus accomplished this by observing that the mapping 
s: x1x2...xn... + x1/2 + x2/22 + . . . + xn/2n + . . . 
from sequences (called “trialsl’ or outcomes”) to dyadic expan- 
sions is a measure-preserving map. More precisely, it is a map 
betweeen a specified o-field in the space of “trials,” (on which 
probability is to be defined and to be u-additive), and the 
already familiar o-field of Lebesgue-measurable sets of the 
interval [O,l], with the familiar Lebesgue measure defined thereon. 
We shall refer to this mapping S as the Steinhaus map. 
It will be observed that the correspondence between real 
numbers x and their dyadic expansions .xlx2...xn... is l-l except 
for those x of the form m/2", the so-called dyadic rationals. 
These numbers have two dyadic expansions, one terminating and 
the other with all x, equal to 1 for sufficiently large n. The 
Steinhaus map from sequences to dyadic expansions can be inter- 
preted as a map s from sequences to the real numbers in [O,l] 
which is “essentially” l-l, since only the denumerable set of 
dyadic rationals have two pre-images. From the point of view of 
measure theory the presence of these dyadic rationals and the 
corresponding failure of the Steinhaus map to be l-l is merely an 
inconvenience, and we take the liberty of omitting specific 
references to them henceforth. 
More specifically, the Steinhaus map s determines a u-algebra 
% of sets in the space of sequences of all possible outcomes by 
8 = {S-l(F) : F is a Lebesgue measurable subset of [O,l] ) and 
determines an associated measure P on 8 defined by P(E) = m(F) 
if E = s-l(F). The resulting I3 and its associated measure P(*) 
(or more generally the completion of 8 with respect to P(S)) 
then give the space of sequences the structure of a probability 
space in the modern sense, fulfilling all the axioms introduced 
by Steinhaus. 
l.c. THE KOLMOGOROV ZERO-ONE LAW 
There are known today several theorems which assert that a 
wide class of sets, obtained from some probabilistic sequence of 
events, can have only the probability 0 or 1. Perhaps the best 
known, and one of the earliest, is that of Kolmogorov 11933, 691. 
The full machinery of the Kolmogorov Zero-One Law is more 
general and more complex than the instances dealt with here. 
For the sake of completeness, we give below a formulation slightly 
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less general than the one of Kolmogorov, in that we limit our- 
selves to product spaces with product measure defined on them. 
Suppose that 
probability space 
for each positive integer n, Isl,,8,,~,) is a 
R, with a given a-field I$, and a countably 
additive non-negative measure n, defined on the sets of 6, 
(normalized by ~~(52,) = 1). Then the product space 
Q = Jlpn becomes a probability space if we take for its associated 
a-field 8 the a-field generated by sets of the form 
BIXBZX... XB xfl n n+lXQn+2xRn+3X... . (Sets of the above form are 
called “cylinder-sets” in R. ) That is, there exists a unique 
a-additive non-negative normalized measure on the sets of 8, 
which we shall denote by u, determined by the condition that 
~-I(B~~B~X...XB~XR~+~XR~+~X...) = u(B1) idB2)4(Bn). 
This fact was established by Kolmogorov [1933]. The resulting 
probability snace {G,B,n) is called the product of the spaces 
QJ$l,L& u is called the product measure, B is called the 
product a-field. 
A set E of 8 is called a “tail event” if p(EflC) = u(E)p(C) 
for every cylinder set c. 
The Zero-One Law of Kolmogorov says that every tail event 
E satisfies p(E) = 0 or p(E) = 1. (It readily follows that the 
tail events are themselves a sub a-field of 8 consisting pre- 
cisely of the sets of u measure 0 or 1.) 
A condition on a set E of 8 that assures that E be a tail 
event is that 
(11 implies 
w = (w1,w2 ,..., wn ,...) E E 
w’ = (w’ w’ 1, *,..., w; ,...) E E 
whenever U; = wk for all but finitely many values of k. An 
equivalent formulation is that w and w’ are both in E (or both 
in EC) whenever w and w’ coincide after deletion of a (common) 
initial segment. This condition is essentially equivalent to 
the more abstract definition of tail event given above. 
Let us now specialize this to the case in which the 
probability spaces @,,K,,n,) are as simple as possible: Qil 
consists of two points, called “success” and “failure,” or 1 or 
0, respectively; 23, consists of the four possible subsets of 
n n; and Pn is defined by u,(0) = 0, v,(success) = pn, 
u,(failure) = qn = 1 - p,, un4in) = 1. 
In this special case, s2 is the set of infinite sequences 
of 0 and 1, and the above set E considered by Borel, consisting 
of those sequences with infinitely many l’s, is a tail event, 
since it clearly satisfies condition (I). Hence Kolmogorov’s 
Zero-One Law contains Borel’s Zero-One Law as a special case. 
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(The notation !J (E) , rather than P(E), is conventional in this 
context .) 
Further, if each pn = l/2 (classically described as repeated 
tosses of an unbiased coin) the set BO defined by (1) also 
satisfies (I), so that from the viewpoint of the Kolmogorov 
Zero-One Law, p(BO) (or P(B0) in our earlier notation) is known 
to be 0 or 1, and the merit of the Bore1 Law of Normal Numbers 
is to specify further that it must be 1. 
2.2. VAN VLECK AND BOREL 
It is virtually unknown today that Bore1 (and a fortiori, 
Kolmogorov) had a precursor, the American E. Van Vleck. In 1908, 
he established a Zero-One Law vastly more general than Borel’s 
(indeed, much closer to Kolmogorov’s). In addition, Van Vleck 
had within his grasp, but failed to establish, a theorem which 
we will call the Extended Van Vleck Theorem and which establishes 
a result curiously similar to, but slightly weaker than, Borel’s 
Law of Normal Numbers. In the language of probability theory, 
the Extended Van Vleck Theorem states 
(4) P(V0) = 1 
where VO is the set of dyadic expansions satisfying 
(5) ~;$qL!!$]zl. 
Clearly, since BoCVO the rekult contained in (4) is indeed 
weaker than Borel’s [2]. If we introduce the name “nearly normal” 
for those dyadic expansions lying in VO, then the theorem Van 
Vleck narrowly missed proving asserts that the probability of a 
dyadic expansion being “nearly normal” is 1. 
In the interests of historical accuracy, it must be observed 
that Van Vleck always used the language of measure, not proba- 
bility. We shall use m(s) to indicate the Lebesgue measure of 
a set in the unit interval [O,l], and p(q) to indicate the proba- 
bility of a set of sequences of O’s and l’s (or equivalently, 
of dyadic expansions) produced by a sequence of independent 
identical trials with an unbiased coin. That these are neces- 
sarily equal is a restatement of the fact that the Steinhaus map 
is measure-preserving as described above. It is entirely possi- 
ble that the present-day obscurity of Van Vleck’s work is an 
unfortunate consequence of the fact that it preceded the initial 
work of Bore1 and the subsequent developments which permit its 
probabilistic interpretation. To the extent that Van Vleck’s 
work was read at all, it seems not to have been read by proba- 
bilists. 
In what follows, we examine in more detail the assertions 
of Van Vleck, indicating their relations to classic results, 
and their historic role. We also complete the argument which 
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Van Vleck initiated, to show how the Extended Van Vleck Theorem 
follows readily from his main result, which we shall call the 
Van Vleck Zero-One Law. While the terminology “the Extended 
Van Vleck Theorem” is cumbersome and perhaps represents a slight 
elasticity in the art of attribution, the term “the Van Vleck 
Zero-One Law” seems to us undisputable, and an overdue recogniza- 
tion of deserved priority. 
2.b. THE PROGRAM OF VAN VLECK 
The Van Vleck paper is concerned, not with probability, but 
with a program to construct a non-measurable set without the 
intervention of the Axiom of Choice. To this end, he first 
established that every set E in [O,l] with a certain geometric 
character, which he called “homogeneous,” necessarily satisfies 
one of the alternatives: (i) m(E) = 0, (ii) m(E) = 1, 
(iii) m*(E) = 1, m,(E) = 0, where m*(e) and m,(s) represent 
Lebesgue outer and inner measure respectively. Alternative (iii) 
clearly implies that E is non-measurable. As it turns out, the 
class of measurable homogeneous sets (for which (iii) is excluded 
by hypothesis) is only slightly less general than the class of 
sets of the Kolmogorov Zero-One Law when applied to the case of 
repeated identical tosses of an unbiased coin. More specifically, 
when Kolmogorov’s original condition (I) is translated, via the 
Steinhaus map, to an assertion concerning the unit interval, and 
probability P(s) is interpreted thereon as Lebesgue measure m(a), 
the result can be compared directly with Van Vleck’s Zero-One 
Law, which we shall do below. 
It was Van Vleck’s purpose to exploit alternatives (i)-(iii) 
in order to construct a set E of “homogeneous” character pos- 
sessing an additional (anti-) symmetry property, namely that E 
and its complement EC were to be obtained from each other by 
reflection about the point x = l/2. More explicity, E was to be 
“homogeneous”and constructed so that 
(61 EC = {l - x: :c E El. 
Condition (6) shows that E and EC are congruent, and therefore, 
if measurable, have the same measure. It follows that a “homo- 
geneous” set E satisfying (6) is necessarily non-measurable. 
(The precise definition of tlhomogeneous’t will be given in a later 
section. ) 
Van Vleck showed that any set whose rule for membership 
depended only on the “ultimate form” of the digits in the binary 
expansion for the points x of [O,l] is necessarily homogeneous. 
To say that the rule for membership depends on the “ultimate 
form” of x = .x1x2... means specifically, for Van Vleck, that 
if y = .yIy2..., and if for some N and p (depending on x and y), 
yrl = xn+pj n > N, then x and y are either both in the set or both 
in its complement. Here N i‘s a positive integer, and p an integer 
such that N + p > 0. This defines an equivalence relation: 
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x’ and y are equivalent if their expansions differ only by a shift, 
except for finite initial segments. An equivalent formulation 
is that x and y have the same “ultimate form” (i.e., belong to 
the same equivalence class) if their dyadic expansionscoincide 
after a suitable initial segment has been dropped from each. The 
reader will note the similarity to condition (I) above. 
The two may be compared directly as follows: condition (I) 
for a “tail event” E is 
(7) 
x= E E if and only if ~xlx2-xn-~~ 
Y = .Y~Y~--Y~X~+~X~+~ E E 
for every n = O,l,Z,... and where y1,y2,...,yn are any choice of 
n zeros and ones. (When n = 0), y is to be interpreted as x,) 
By contrast, Van Vleck’s definition of homogeneity leads to the 
condition that a set E is homogeneous if it enjoys the “ultimate 
form” property : 
(81 x E E if and only if .yly2...y x p n+l’ ‘. EE 
for any choice of the positive integers p and,n and where 
yl-..fiyp are any choice of p zeros and ones. Thus Van Vleck’s 
condition concerning “ultimate form” is more stringent than 
Kolmogorov’s formulation of tail-event, and so Van Vleck’s 
theorem is correspondingly less general. It is readily seen that 
an equivalent form of Van Vleck’s condition (8) is 
(8’1 
x E E if and only if .x E E, n+lxn+2sss 
for every n = 0,1,2, . . , . 
A more recent, equivalent formulation will be given in the con- 
cluding section. 
The construction which Van Vleck proposed for a non-measurable 
homogeneous set E had the following rule for membership. 
vn (x) 
Let A(x) =lim- 
vn (x) 
u, (x) 
, B(x) = lim(xl. 
n 
From this it follows at once that A(1 - x) = l/B(x), B(l - x) = 
l/A(x) . (It should be remarked that the set for which 
A(x) = B(x) = 1 is the Bore1 set BO of “normal” numbers .) The 
set V+ = {x : A(x) ’ A(1 - x)) = 
because it depends only on the 
Gc : A(x) > l/B(x)) is homogeneous 
expansion of its members. 
“ultimate form” of the dyadic 
The set V, is entirely assigned to E. 
Further, let V- = {x: A(x) < A(1 - x)} = {x: A(x) < l/B(x) 1. 
Then V is also homogeneous and V and V are images of each 
other Ey reflection about x = l/Z+(so that x E V 
(1 - x) E v ). 
if and only if 
The set V is entirely assigned zo EC. 
The crFterion for meGbership of the points x in V+ or V - 
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makes no appeal to the Axiom of Choice, but rather to the “ulti- 
mate form” of the binary expansion of x, in terms of the behavior 
of the above defined A(x) and B(x). However, the rule for member 
ship in E proposed by Van Vleck leaves thus far undecided the 
membership in E or EC for those x in neither V nor V . This is 
the set denoted VO above in (5). One can complete the definition 
of E by assigning the elements of V. arbitrarily to E or EC so 
long as elements of the same ultimate form are assigned con- 
sistently. This can be done by an Axiom of Choice argument, 
sending the equivalence class [x] containing x to E (or EC) and 
the equivalence class [l - x] to EC (or E, respectively). Only 
for rational numbers x do x and l-x fail to have distinct equiva- 
lence classes, as was observed by Van Vleck. The result is a 
construction of a non-measurable homogeneous set, employing the 
Axiom of Choice [3]. But not content with this construction, 
elegant as it was, Van Vleck hoped the appeal to the Axiom of 
Choice could be avoided entirely. 
Van ‘$leck’s hoped-for example depended on showing that 
(V+ (8 V-) = V. is of outer measure 0 where by its definition 
(9) v. = cx: A(x).B(x) = 1). 
The notation A 8 B means the union of the disjoint sets A and B. 
Van Vleck was unable to verify this assertion, but observed that 
if it were true, then V+ and V would be (apart from the set V. 
which would have outer measure-o, and would therefore be negligi- 
ble) complements and homogeneous without recourse to the Axiom 
of Choice. They would then of necessity be non-measurable. Al- 
though not precisely satisfying the original motivating relation- 
ship (6), V+ and V are reflections of each other around the 
point x = l/2, and-are “almost” complements as indicated by 
the relation 
(10) v+c=vo@v~, v = 11 -X:XEV+). - 
Thus V, and Vt would be explicitly constructable, complementary, 
non-measurable sets, as desired. The key unverified assertion 
(111 m*(V,l = 0 
was the only missing piece of the puzzle. 
Indeed, Van Vleck observed that if V. was merely of inner 
measure less than 1, then the set VE = V, 69 V- is a subset of 
the unit interval, itself partitioned into non-measurable sets 
V, and V . However, Van Vleck admitted that he had not been able 
to show &(Vg) < 1, though he remained hopeful: ‘I... Thus it 
seems to me possible, and perhaps not difficult, to remove the 
arbitrary element of choice in my example by confining one’s 
attention to a proper subset of the continuum, though as yet I 
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have not succeeded in proving that this is possible.” 
[Van Vleck 1908, 2411. 
From the very definition of Lebesgue measure m, and of 
Lebesgue outer measure m*, (11) is equivalent to 
(12) m(V,) = 0. 
It was for this reason that Van Vleck found himself, one year 
before Borel’ s landmark paper, directly addressing himself to 
the question whether, in the terminology introduced by Borel, 
almost no numbers were normal, and hoping to prove it to be true. 
The authors have been unable, thus far, to settle whether 
or not Bore1 was aware of Van Vleck’s 1908 paper in 1909, when 
he addressed a similar question. The only evidence available to 
us so far is from an informal diary kept by Van Vleck. This con- 
tains several entries for November 1905 during a sabbatical stay 
in Europe. During this month Van Vleck met Bore1 on several 
occasions, called on Bore1 and went to a party chez Borel. Much 
contact with the French mathematical circle including Painleve, 
Frechet, and Hadamard continued through January 1906, culminating 
in a dinner pary in his honour given by the Hadamards. This 
certainly raises the possibility that Van Vleck communicated his 
results on “non-measurable sets ” to Borel, perhaps around the 
period 29 February - 7 March, 1908, when the paper was first read 
and then received for publication. Had this occured it might 
have sown the seed of considering the decimal (or binary) digits 
in Borel’s mind as a fruitful example of his emerging theory of 
“denumerable probability.” The fact that the set VD occured in 
connection with non-measurable sets while B arose in I’denumerable 
probability” seemingly free of such entangltng alliances would 
surely have appealed to Borel. 
2.c. A CRUCIAL OVERSIGHT OF VAN VLECK 
Several observations can be made concerning Van Vleck’s 
partition of [0, l] into V, 8 V @ V : 
(a) V+,V ,VO are c~earlymez&able: A(X) and A(1 - x) 
are lim sups oT measurable functions, hence themselves measurable, 
hence so are the sets where A(X) > A(l-x), A(x) = A(l-x), 
A(x) < A(l-x) respectively, 
(13) (b) m(V+> = m(V) 
since reflection about x = l/2 is a congruence, and therefore 
a measure-preserving transformation. 
(c) V+,V-,Vo are all “homogeneous.” Van Vleck himself 
observed that a set whose membership rule depends only on the 
“ultimate form” of its elements is necessarily “homogeneous.” 
In particular 
(14) W+) , m(V-I, m(V,) are each equal to 0 or 1, 
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by Van Vleck’s alternatives (i)-(iii), and 
(15) m(V+) + m(V-) + m(V0) = 1 
by the finite additivity of Lebesgue measure. 
The only choices of 0 and 1 in (14) which satisfy (13) and 
(15) are 
(16) m(V+) = m(V ) = 0, m(V,) = 1. - 
All of these facts were available to Van Vleck. It was only 
his program, aimed as it was at producing an instance of non- 
measurability, that could have distracted him from noting, as 
above, that V,, V-, and V. are measurable by their very con- 
struction (See (a) above). 
Thus (16), which we call the Extended Van Vleck Theorem, and 
and which states that almost all numbers are “nearly normal,” 
could have been proved by Van Vleck himself had he simply 
observed that V,, V-, and V were measurable sets. 
To summarize thus far:‘Van Vleck established, in his alterna- 
tives (i)- (iii), that if a set E in [O,l] is both measurable and 
“homogeneous, ‘I then m(E) is either 0 or 1. By so doing he proved 
the first Zero-One Law, and indeed one which is vastly more 
general than Borel’s in the context of binary digits. He also 
conjectured that m* (VO) < 1 although he could easily have 
established (as above) that m(V0) = 1. Significantly, from the 
historic viewpoint, both his Zero-One Law and the conjecture 
m+(Vo) < 1 are couched entirely in the language and frame- 
work of Lebesgue measure, and exhibit no link with proba- 
bility . It is part (indeed a large part) of Borel’s achieve- 
ment in 1909 to approach these questions from a probabilistic 
viewpoint. 
2.d. AN OVERSIGHT OF BOREL 
It is supremely ironic that Bore1 himself suffered from a 
corresponding oversight, arising at least in part from a similar 
devotion to a main program: Bore1 did not see that his results 
were equally describable in the language of measure theory. This 
last assertion is based on a detailed examination, to be pub- 
lished elsewhere, of Borel’s paper (and his earlier and later 
works as well). However, it is possible at least to sketch here 
the basis for this surprising conclusion. 
First, Borel’s approach to the study of denumerable 
sequences of “coin-tosses” with probability pn of success on the 
nth toss, can be mapped, by a suitable generalized Steinhaus map, 
to the interval [O,l], but only by introducing a measure on [O,l] 
which generalizes Lebesgue’s measure. No such generalization of 
measure existed in 1909, and indeed it was not until Radon [1913], 
Car%thEodory [1914], and Frdchet [1915], that such generalizations 
were achieved [4]. 
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Concerning the special case pn = l/2 (n = 1,2,3,...), it is 
true that Bore1 remarked that a “geometric point of view” would 
lead to questions of measure, which he preferred to leave aside. 
However there is much internal evidence that the key notion of 
a-additivity was not a cardinal feature of probability for Bore1 
neither as an axiom nor a theorem, nor even a reliable heuristic 
guide. (For example, Bore1 sought alternative proofs that the 
probability of a countable union of sets, each of probability 
zero, was zero, specifically to avoid appeal to this principle.) 
Most significant, perhaps, is Borel’s hope, revealed in his 
concluding lines, that the entire tangle of ideas enveloping the 
continuum (most especially, its non-denumerable and hence 
“unknowable” character) might be a side-stepped by using only 
denumerable trials: 
“When the theory of denumerable probabilities 
will have been developed in the manner just indi- 
cated, it will be interesting to compare the acquired 
results with those which one obtains in the theory 
of continuous or geometric probability. 
“There exists certainly (if it is not a misuse 
to employ the verb to exist) in the geometric 
continuum some elements which cannot be defined: 
such is the real sense of the important and celebrated 
proposition of Mr. Georg Cantor: the continuum is 
not denumerable. The day when these undefinable 
elements might really be put aside and when one 
might no longer require that they intervene more 
or less implicitly, there would certainly result 
a great simplification in the methods of Analysis; 
I would be happy if the preceding pages could 
contribute to conveying the interest which would 
be attached to the study of such questions.” 
[Bore1 1909, 2711 (Italics in the original.) 
This passage argues powerfully that Bore1 considered “de- 
numerable probability” as an alternative to measure theory and/or 
geometric probability, and not a mere restatement of it, 
especially in the crucial cases of dyadic and continued fraction 
expansions which were discussed by him. 
In summary, Van Vleck was unconcerned with the fact that 
measure might be interpreted as probability, while Bore1 was 
not fully aware that probability might be interpreted as measure. 
(Bore1 remained of course, a notorious skeptic concerning non- 
measurable sets.) These facts surely contributed to the delay 
in interpreting Van Vleck’s work as a contribution to probability 
theory, 
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3.a. THE IMPACT OF VAN VLECK’S WORK 
The first (and almost the last) mention we have found of any 
realization that Bore1 and Van Vleck were dealing with closely 
related phenomena occurred in 1910, in a paper by G. Faber [1910]. 
The first part of this paper was devoted to the discussion of 
those conditions on thk behavior of a function at dyadic rational 
points in [O,l], which are sufficient or necessary conditions for 
the almost-everywhere continuity, differentiability, and recti- 
fiability of the function. In particular, Faber constructed a 
function which he described as being “as little differentiable 
as possible ” for a rectifiable function. His function, which 
was monotonic, failed to be differentiable precisely at the 
complement of Borel’s set of normal numbers (denoted BO above) 
introduced the previous year. Lebesgue’s general theorem to the 
effect that monotonicity implies that the set of non-differenti- 
able points is of measure zero was of course well known, and was 
acknowledged by Faber was seminal to his own study. Faber 
readily concluded, by applying Lebesgue’s theorem to his example, 




m(B;) = 0 
(17’) m(Bo) = 1. 
Immediately after drawing this conclusion, Faber compares 
his result with both those of Van Vleck and Borel. The reader 
will observe in the quotation below that Faber gives an expo- 
sition of Van Vleck’s result not in terms of a set (and its com- 
plement) but in terms of its characteristic function, denoted 
Q(x). The assertion that V+ and V (See (6) and (10) above) 
are congruent by reflection about x = l/2 then becomes 
$(l - x) = 1 - Q(x), 
if x is not in the “undecidable” set of VO. 
set we have denoted Bi, 
Referring to the 
those x for which A(x) = 1, B(x) = 1 
fails, Faber writes: 
“This theorem appears interesting to me from 
many points of view. 
“First, it gives a simple example of a set, 
which is not only everywhere dense, but also has 
the cardinality of the continuum in every interval, 
however small, and nonetheless has measure zero. 
“Bore1 recently proved, following a formulation 
of suitable definitions concerning denumerable proba- 
bilities, that the probability that a point belong 
to the above set is zero. The comparison of the 
above theorem with the Bore1 result suggests the 
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question: 
“Is the probability--according to the Bore1 
set-up, which possibly might need to be extended 
to answer this question--that a number belongs to 
a prescribed set of zero measure, always equal to 
zero? And conversely: is a set always of measure 
zero, if the probability that a point belongs to 
it is equal to zero? 
“Finally the above theorem concerning the set 
M [Authors’ note: Bi in our notation] is closely 
connected with an example given by Mr. Van Vleck 
of a non-analytically representable function 151 
Q(x) (0 <x Cl). The Van Vleck function takes 
only two values 0 and 1, and except for a set of 
measure zero [Authors’ note: the dyadic rationals] 
takes one value at the point x and the other value 
at the point l-x; the definition of 4(x) remains 
incomplete, insofar as for a given x it cannot be 
decided whether 4 (x) = 1 and 4 (l-x) = 0 or 
contrariwise 4(x) = 0 and 4 (l-x) = 1; for those 
x for which lim vn/l-l, exists and is different from 
1, one can easily make the decision, and Mr. Van Vleck 
is encouraged to inquire whether this remark might 
point the way to overcoming the incompleteness 
(“Unvollst~ndigkeit”) of the definition of o(x). 
That this is not the case is shown by my above- 
proved theorem; for one is led exactly to the 
lim Vn/ 
for which no 
!J 
x-set, “=l in completing 
the definition; . . ,I’ [Faber 1610, 4001. 
(Italics in the original). 
It is to be noted that while Van Vleck’s construction 
focuses attention on VO as the points difficult to assign to E 
or EC (See (9)), Faber shows that the subset, defined by (1)) 
is the real nub of the matter. 
To summarize, Faber has proved (in measure-theoretic not 
probabilistic, terms) Borel’s theorem m(B0) = 1 (See (2)) and 
hence that Van Vleck’s hopes are dashed since VO 3 BO implies 
mPJ0) > m&d [61. Further, Faber’s comments furnish a remar- 
kably vivid picture of the “state of the art” as late as 1910, 
at least in the mind of an analyst as up-to-date as was Faber. 
The implications m(E) = 0 implies P(E) = 0 and P(E) = 0 implies 
m(E) = 0 are viewed as a possibility, not a tautology, and the 
more general identity 
P(E) = m(E) 
had to await Steinhaus for a suitably incisive formulation and 
accompanying proof. (For other evidence of the imperfect 
realization of the link between probability and measure theory 
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in the period between Bore1 and Steinhaus, the reader is referred 
to the authors’ forthcoming paper on this, and to the Doctoral 
dissertation by J. Barone [1974].) 
3.b. THE DEFINITION OF “HOMOGENEOUS”: THE WORK OF KNOPP AND 
JACOBSTHAL 
The Van Vleck Zero-One Law is the alternative (i)-(iii) 
cited above for sets in [O,l] which have “homogeneous” character 
in the terminology of Van Vleck. The precise definition of 
“homogeneous” given by Van Vleck is best understood by defining 
it in two stages, as indeed Van Vleck did. The first, and sim- 
pler notion, is that a set E in [O,l] is homogeneous if given 
any sub-interval [a,b], 0 < a <b < 1, the set E n [a,b] is “gee- 
metrically similar I’ to the-set-E itself. More precisely, the 
mapping x + a f (b-a)x maps the set E onto the set EfI [a,b]. 
This condition is however a little too stringent to permit the 
construction of abundant examples. The second, and final defini- 
tion, is that a set E in [O,l] is homogeneous if, given an arbi- 
trary sub-interval [a,b] of [O,l], there exists a countable union 
of sub-intervals i, of [a,b] having at most end-points in common, 
and having total length arbitrarily close to b-a such that E is 
“geometrically similar”;in the above sense, to each set E n iv. 
If a set E has the property that its rule for membership depends 
only on the “ultimate form” of the dyadic expansion 
x= .XlX2X3...Xn..., then E is easily seen to be homogeneous 
since the sub-intervals i, of an arbitrarily given [a,b] may be 
taken to be its maximal sub-intervals of the form 
bGn I (p+1)/2~] for various choices of n and p. The mapping 
x -t ~/2~ + ~/2~ then maps E onto E n [p/2", (p+1)/2"], since 
x and p/2" + ~/2~ have the same “ultimate form” for their dyadic 
expansions in the sense of (8) and (8’) above. Of course similar 
constructions with bases other than 2 produce homogeneous sets 
as well. 
In 1915 Knopp and Jacobsthal [Jacobsthal and Knopp 19151 
proposed a slightly wider definition of homogeneous, again with 
emphasis on the fact that measurability was not assumed. The 
Knopp-Jacobsthal definition is that a set E of [O,l] is “homo- 
geneous with density d” if for a suitable choice of the constant 
d one has for every sub-interval [a,b] of [O,l]: 
(19) m*(E n [aAl) = d b-a 
The left-hand side of (19) is called the density of E in the 
interval [a,b] and is also denoted +(a,b). To avoid confusion 
with Van Vleck’s definition, we will call sets with property (19) 
sets of “constant density.” The main Knopp-Jacobsthal results 
were again theorems of zero-one type. In particular they proved 
the following theorems (where the numeration is our own): 
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Theorem 1. A set of constant density d necessarily has 
d = 0 or d = 1 (The Knopp-Jacobsthal Zero-One Law). 
Theorem 2. If +(a,b) _'r < 1 for all [a,b] c [O,l], and 
some fixed r, then E is of constant density 0. 
Theorem 3. If l&(a,b) > r > 0 for all [a,b] C [O,l] and 
some fixed r, then E is of constant density 1. (Knopp and 
Jacobsthal acknowledge Caratheodory’s remark that the last two 
theorems, which imply the first, are contained in Lebesgue’s 
theorem that almost every point of a set E is “a point of densi- 
ty 1” in the terminology of Lebesgue; however they contend that 
their methods are more elementary and that they do not assume 
measurability.) 
The definition of constant density, given above, is broader 
than the “homogeneity” of Van Vleck, whom Knopp and Jacobsthal 
cite for his earlier work which they described as “for the pur- 
pose of the construction of a non-measurable set.” A set which 
is homogeneous in the Van Vleck sense is necessarily of constant 
density (so that with the aid of their results the alternatives 
zz(;(iii) of V an Vleck naturally follow). The converse is not 
: if E is a set of constant density, the same need not be 
true of EC, while if E is homogeneous in Van Vleck’s sense, EC 
is again so, 
Not until 1926 did Knopp [1926], this time alone, employ his 
his wider notion of sets of constant density in connection with 
the Bore1 Law of Normal Numbers and allied questions. He then 
observed that a considerable number of recently proved theorems 
concerning asymptotic density of zeros and ones in the dyadic 
expansions x = .xIx2...xn... assert that the set of x for which 
one or another asymptotic assertion is made is a set of measure 
either zero or one. Specifically, if v,(x) is the number of 
ones among xI,x2,...,xn, then v,(x) = n/2 + o(n) holds for a set 
of measure 1 (Borel); v,(x) = n/z + O(nl/‘+c) holds for a set 
of measure 1 for any given E > 0 (Hausdorff); 
v,(x) = n/2 + O(t'n log n) holds for a set of measure 1 
(Hardy-Littlewood) ; v,(x) = n/2 + O&i) holds for a set of 
measure 0 (Hardy-Littlewood); v,(x) = n/2 + O(dn log log n) 
holds for a set of measure 1 (Khintchine). 
Knopp shows that all such theorems define sets of constant 
density, and hence of density 0 or 1, thus, in a sense, unifying 
these earlier results. In fact, each of these sets has a rule 
for membership which depends on the “ultimate form” of the dya- 
die expansion, and is therefore “homogeneous” in Van Vleck’s 
sense. Since they are evidently measurable sets, they must 
satisfy the Zero-One alternative of Van Vleck. 
As to probabilistic interpretations, the situation in 1926 
had progressed considerably in the direction dimly viewed by 
Faber: “It is almost a purely terminological matter to use the 
concept of probability for these theorems: if a point-set M lies 
in the interval [O,l], one can without further ado describe its 
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measure u as the probability that an arbitrary real number be- 
longs to the set M. In this manner of expression, which many of 
the above mentioned authors use, the most strikingly prominent 
phenomenon is that for all of these questions the (transfinite) 
probability (sic) that a real number satisfies the conditions of 
the above theorems always has either one or the other of the two 
values 0 or 1 and none of the values between 0 and 1 come into 
play.” [Knopp 1926, 4111. 
In effect, Knopp testifies to the fact that by 1926 (if not 
earlier) at least a certain class of problems were regarded as 
interchangeably expressible as problems of measure or of proba- 
bility. The revealing adjective “transfinite” presumably indi- 
cates that “ordinary” probability by contrast, is not associated 
with measure. The class of problems in question all deal with 
complicated sets in [O,l], direct descendents of problems of 
“geometric probability” of the 19th century. In fact, Steinhaus 
had been much clearer on this point three years earlier. The 
full modern scope of probability-as-measure is not foreshadowed 
by Knapp’s relatively modest remarks. He had, however, helped 
focus the concept of a Zero-One Law. 
Nonetheless, it seems to the authors that Van Vleck was 
closer than Knopp to the viewpoint ultimately adopted by 
Kolmogorov, inasmuch as Van Vleck’s construction, unlike Knapp’s, 
depends palpably on the dyadic representations and their “ulti- 
mate form,” which leads to the cylinder set concept successfully 
exploited by Kolmogorov. In any even, Van Vleck’s priority is 
unquestioned. 
It is perhaps surprising that in the literature of proba- 
bility theory, Van Vleck is never mentioned [7]. His Zero-One 
Law, and his proximity to cylinder sets and tail events was a 
remarkable achievement in 1908. The la.st reference to Van Vleck 
we have located is a lone one by Knopp [1926] to the definition 
of “homogeneous” given by Van Vleck as being narrower than his 
own. 
4.a. KNOPP, VAN VLECK AND ERGODIC THEORY 
While the folk-history of probability theory has up to now 
bypassed Van Vleck, the contribution of Knopp [1926] has met a 
better fate. In what follows, we explain how this came about. 
Therefore it is appropriate to sketch the contents of Knopp 
[1926] as a preliminary. We will conclude with our final 
reformulation of Van Vleck’s Zero-One Law in contemporary terms. 
Having introduced his concept of “constant density” de- 
scribed above, and his Zero-One Law (cited as Theorem 1 above, 
from Jacobsthal and Knopp [1915]), Knopp was able in 1926 to 
introduce several examples of (measurable) sets having constant 
density and hence measure zero or one. The examples cited in 
the previous section were indeed not the only ones presented in 
Knopp [ 19261. Another class of examples was also given, 
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constucted by imposing conditions on the “ultimate form” of the 
elements of the continued fraction expansion of x (here x is an 
irrational number in the unit interval). We describe the meaning 
of “ultimate form” and indicate Knapp’s second class of examples 
below. 
4.b. BOREL AND KNOPP 
It should be remarked that Knopp was following the order of 
Borel’s 1909 paper in general outline. That paper was divided 
into three major sections, the first concluding a zero-one law, 
the second containing an application (and a refinement) of this 
zero-one law to the binary (and more generally n-ary) expansions 
of points from the unit interval, and the third section dealt 
similarly with terms arising in the continued fraction expansion 
of (irrational) numbers lying in the unit interval. The Bore1 
Law of Normal Numbers is the chief result of the second section; 
the chief result of the third section, i.e. the continued frac- 
tion application, attracted like notice, and had been pursued by 
authors such as F. Bernstein [1911; 19121, F. Hausdorff [1914], 
A. Khintchine [1923; 19241, and shortly after, P. Levy [1929]. 
These sets of constant density presented by Knopp thus belong 
to a tradition well known to probabilists. 
Let us introduce the notation 
1 1 1 
x=-- - a1 + a2 + . ..a. + . . . 
for the continued fraction expansion of an arbitrary irrational 
number x lying in the unit interval. The elements 
al, a2, . . . . a,, . . . are positive integers determined uniquely 
by x, and conversely any infinite sequence of positive integers 
determine a unique corresponding irrational number. 
A set E will be said to be determined by the “ultimate form” 
of the continued fraction expansions of its members if 
(33) 
x E E if and only if every xn E E where 
1 1 
X = - - 
n a + n+l + an+2 “’ ’ 
We have introduced the phrase “ultimate form” (not used by Knopp) 
to stress the analogy with the earlier examples of both Van Vleck 
and Knopp using binary expansions. 
The chief result of Knopp is that every measurable set 
constructed to satisfy (20) is of constant density, and hence of 
measure zero or one. 
The reader will observe in particular the close analogy of 
(20) with (8’), our earlier reformulation of Van Vleck’s Zero-One 
Law. Examples of sets E constructed in accordance with condition 
(20) are: all (irrational) x such that an = 7 for infinitely 
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many values of n, or such that the sequence {a,) is bounded, or 
such that the sequence (a,) has a given upper bound, or such that 
Cl/a, diverges, or converges, etc.. (It is immediate that the 
sets E formed in the above manner are measurable, since each 
element, a = a tx), is a measurable function of x.) These sets 
are not hozogengous in Van Vleck’s sense. 
4.c. MARCZEWSKI AND RYLL-NARDZEWSKI: 
THE T-TRANSFORMATION AND ERGODIC THEORY 
A key formulation of condition (20), due apparently to E. 
Marczewski (cf. Ryll-Nardzewski [1951, 741) is obtained by 
introducing the function [y] = greatest integer 2 y, and the 
transformation 
T(x) = l/x - [l/x] 
which maps the unit interval onto itself [8]. 
If 
1 1 1 x=------ 
al + a2 + . . . an + . . . . 
then 
1 1 1 T(x)=-- - 
a2 + a3 + .,. an + . . . . 
In terms of T, (20) can be reformulated as either 
(20’) x E E if and only if F(x) E E for every n = 1,2,3,. . . 
or, more succinctly, 
(21) T-l(E) = E. 
The idea of exploiting these reformulations, especially (21), 
is due to Ryll-Nardzewski [1951], who describes (21) in con- 
temporary terms by saying E is invariant with respect to the 
transformation T. 
4.d. THE S-TRANSFORMATION 
An analogous transformation 
S(x) = 2x - [2x] 
maps the unit interval onto itself. 
If x = .blb2. . . , bi = 0 or 1, then S(x) = .b2b3. . . , and condi- 
tion (8’), can be reformulated in terms of S as either x E E 
if and only if sn(x) E E for every n = 1,2,3,... or, more 
succinctly, 
(8’ ‘1 S-'(E) = E. 
Thus Van Vleck’s examples of homogeneous sets defined by the 
“ultimate form” property are precisely the sets E which are 
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invariant with respect to the transformation S. 
4.e. FROM KNOPP TO METRIC TRANSITIVITY 
Ryll-Nardzewski made use of (21), by observing further 
that the measure 
1 




("Gauss measure") has the property 
(22) v(J) = v(T+J)) 
for any sub-interval J of the unit interval and more generally 
for any (Lebesgue) measurable set J lying in the unit interval. 
The proof of (22) is quite elementary [Kac 1959, 89-92; Khintchine 
1964, section 15; Kuzmin 19281 and seems to go back to Gauss 
[Urban 1923; Gnedenko 19571. We note in passing that C. F. Gauss 
is thus the father of the study of the asymptotic or "ultimate 
form" of the elements of continued fraction expansions. 
Further, since 
1 1 1 1 
2ln2 L -- - In2 1+x Z In 2 if O<x<l, - - 
it is immediate that Gauss measure v(.) and Lebesgue measure m(*) 
are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, so that 
v(J) equals zero or one accordingly as m(J) equals zero or one 
respectively. 
Thus Ryll-Nardzewski could recast Knapp's result, incorpo- 
rating these remarks, as follows: if E is a measurable T-invariant 
set, then v(E) is either zero or one. Ryll-Nardzewski definitely 
cites Knopp as the author of this result, since the "hard part" 
is to show that if E is a measurable, T-invariant set, then m(E) 
is either 0 or 1. Thus Knopp has survived in the literature of 
probability theory. 
Once Ryll-Nardzewski had reformulated Knapp's result in 
these terms, he was able to apply a body of theorems well known 
collectively by 1951 (but dating back as early as 1932 to Von 
Neumann and G. D. Birkhoff) as Ergodic Theory. The essential 
elements needed for application of this theory are a measure 
space of total measure 1 (the unit interval in this context), 
together with a measure v(e) on the u-algebra of measurable 
sets, a transformation (the above T) which is measure-preserving 
(meaning, specifically (22)) and with the property that the only 
T-invariant measurable sets have measure 0 or 1. The transfor- 
mation T is then called metrically transitive (or metrically 
indecomposable) with respect to the invariant measure v(.) [81. 
Knapp's contribution is to have established the metric transi- 
tivity of T with respect to the non-invariant measure m(e), while 
Ryll-Nardzewski's contribution is to have applied to T the 
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general theorems of Ergodic Theory dealing with metrically 
transitive transformations and their invariant measures. 
4.e. VAN VLECK RECONSIDERED 
In order to apply the same viewpoint adopted by Ryll- 
Nardzewski to the transformation S, we need only point out that 
(23) m(J) = m(Sl(J)) 
for any sub-interval J of the unit interval, or, more generally 
any measurable subset. In other words, s is measure-preserving 
for Lebesgue measure m(e). This calculation is orders of magni- 
tude more elementary than the corresponding one needed to verify 
its counterpart (22) above. The real significance of Van Vleck's 
Zero-One Law now becomes apparent: every s-invariant measurable 
set must have measure zero or one, so that the measure-preserving 
transformation S is metrically transitive with respect to 
Lebesgue measure on the unit interval. 
Ryll-Nardzewski characterized as Knapp's the theorem that 
the transformation T is metrically transitive (or metrically 
indecomposable) with respect to Lebesgue measure, since this is 
its content when put in the language of Ergodic Theory. There 
is an element of generosity in this, since the transformation 
T was not introduced explicitly by Knopp. Knapp's result in 
any case needs to be reformulated using the invariant Gauss 
measure v(e) to permit application of Ergodic Theory. 
It would seem at least as appropriate to characterize as 
Van Vleck's the theorem that the transformation S is metrically 
transitive for Lebesgue measure, m(o) (and thus to assign 1908 
as its date of discovery). Since s is already measure-preserving 
for this measure, the result permits application of Ergodic 
Theory as stated. It is the first known instance of metric 
transitivity, (preceding by some 20 years the general formulation 
of the concept by G. D. Birkhoff and P. A. Smith). This inter- 
pretation alone should argue for acknowledgement of Van Vleck's 
contribution. 
The significance of metric transitivity can be grasped from 
reading an historical note by G. D. Birkhoff and B. 0. Koopman 
[1932; especially the concluding lines] in which it is remarked 
that Cari!ithgodory [1919, 5801 first introduced measure theory 
into the realm of "dynamics". We may say in view of the pre- 
ceding that without fully realizing it, Van Vleck did something 
of the same sort in 1908; Van Vleck's example, modified neatly to 
the unit square instead of the unit interval, and frequently 
called "the baker's transformation", was shown to be metrically 
transitive in 1933 by Seidel, after this had been conjectured 
by G. D. Birkhoff. Birkhoff was evidently unaware in 1933 of 
the remarkable and neglected contribution of his old friend and 
fellow-analyst Van Vleck, some thirty years earlier. 
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NOTES 
1. The well-known Borel-Cantelli lemmas observe, with 
slightly more precision, that if C pn converges, then P(E) = 0 
even if the trials are allowed to be dependent. 
2. Roughly speaking, the set B. consists of those sequences 
in which 0 and 1 appear with equal asymptotic density l/2, while 
V consists of those sequences for which any persistent tendency 
0g l’s to overmatch O’s is accompanied by an equally persistent 
tendency of O’s to overmatch 1’s. 
3. The reader is referred to Rosenthal [1975] for a con- 
temporary indication of how recently this construction of 
Van Vleck has been ignored. 
4. Steinhaus accomplished this in 1923 for the case 
pn = l/2 (n = 1,2,3 ,... ), and for the more general case 
pn = p (n = 1,2,3 ,... ), 0 <p < 1, but not for arbitrary pn (as 
embodied, for example, in Borel’s Zero-One Law). 
5. Authors’ Note: Evidently “analytische nicht darstellbare 
Funktion” means nonmeasurable function in our terminology. 
6. Of course Borel’s assertion P(Bo) = 1, in 1909, already 
dashes the hopes of Van Vleck if the reinterpretation of proba- 
bility P(*) as Lebesgue measure m(s) is made explicit. 
7. Van Vleck’s near-miss at proving m(V,) = 1 is not to be 
compared to the much deeper and probabilistically oriented resut 
result P(BD) = 1 of Bore1 one year later. 
8. In personal correspondence Professor Marczewski asserts 
that the role of the “shift transformation” for continued 
fractions was first studied by W. Doeblin [1939] in what 
Marczewski describes as “an almost forgotten paper .I’ 
9. The term metrically transitive was introduced by G. D. 
Birkhoff and P. A. Smith [1928, 3651 though limited by them to 
one-to-one (and even analytic) transformations of a surface to 
itself. 
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